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2 Personal income distribution and market
demand
We model income distribution as a continuous di¤erentiable unimodal den-
sity function f(y; µ), de…ned over some positive interval (ym; yM), 0 · ym <
yM · 1. The parameter µ is a mean preserving spread. As is well known, in
probability theory this is a measure of the degree of riskiness of a distribution.
The reason why µ can be fruitfully applied to model income distributions, is
that via changes in µ one can study the e¤ects of changes income dispersion,
as distinct from changes in aggregate (average) income – loosely speaking, an
increase in µ shifts income frequencies towards the tails of the density func-
tion, while a decrease in µ raises the frequency of central income values.Using
a mean preserving spread as de…ned here, amounts to ranking equal-mean
distributions by second-order stochastic dominance. In the literature on in-
come distribution, it is well known that such ranking is equivalent to Lorenz
dominance: µ is thus a proper inequality index satisfying the Pigou-Dalton’s
“principle of transfers” (Atkinson, 1970).2
Formally, letting h 2 (ym; yM) denote the modal income, and letting
subscripts denote partial derivatives, the following holds:
fy(h; µ) = 0
fy(y; µ) > 0 for y < h
fy(y; µ) < 0 for y > h
9=; (1)
Z y
ym
Fµ(x; µ)dx ¸ 0; y < yM
Z yM
ym
Fµ(x; µ)dx = 0
9>>>>=>>>>; (2)
where F (y; µ) =
R y
ym
f(x; µ)dx is the cumulative distribution function.
We specialize our model by imposing some regularity conditions on F (¢; µ).
First, we assume that the mean preserving spread is of the simple type (Roth-
schild and Stiglitz, 1971), i.e. the crossing of distributions implied by (2)
takes place only once. Secondly, we assume that the shift of the frequencies
towards the tails associated to an increase in µ is such that the old and new
density functions intersect only twice.
2Accordingly, an increase in µ shifts unambiguously down the Lorenz curve. The link
between inequality orderings and stochastic dominance has been recently sudied, e.g., by
Formby et al. (1999).
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To see the implications of these restrictions, consider the function Fµ.
Both assumptions are captured by this taking a shape like that exhibited
in Fig. 1c: single crossing of the distributions (Fig. 1a) implies that Fµ
crosses zero in the interior of (ym; yM) only once; double crossing of the
densities (Fig. 1b) implies that this function has only one maximum and one
minimum over (ym; yM). It should be stressed that this behaviour is shared
by many commonly used distributions subject to mean preserving shocks.3
—————————————–
Figure 1 about here
—————————————–
This simple …gure brings out a very general property of the e¤ects of
changes in µ under our assumptions. Four intervals can be identi…ed ac-
cording as Fµ and fµ have the same or the opposite sign. Indeed, for any
y 2 (ym; yA], Fµ > 0 and fµ ¸ 0 (with equality only for y = yA); for any
y 2 (yA; yB], Fµ ¸ 0 (with equality only for y = yB) and fµ < 0; for any
y 2 (yB; yC ], Fµ < 0 and fµ · 0 (with equality only for y = yC); for any
y > yC, Fµ · 0 (with equality only for y = yM) and fµ > 0 (clearly, this
holds in the limit if yM = 1). For ease of notation, we label intervals as
A = (ym; yA], B = (yA; yB], C = (yB; yC ], D = (yC ; yM). Of course, the
boundary values of these intervals in the interior of (ym; yM) are functions of
µ, i.e. yi = yi(µ), i = A;B;C.
Income distribution is immediately connected to market demand, when-
ever each consumer chooses discretely between buying or not buying one unit
of the commodity, according as the quoted price is lower or higher than his
reservation price – the distribution of reservation prices across consumers
can reasonably be thought of as mirroring somehow that of the consumers’
incomes.
We assume throughout that the reservation price coincides with income,
so that market demand is
Q(p; µ) = 1¡ F (p; µ) (3)
where population has been normalized to unity. This is clearly the sharpest
way to model the relationship between income, reservation prices and de-
mand. The weaker assumption of strict proportionality of reservation prices
to income comes out, e.g., in models for durabes, such as that suggested
by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp.366-69). In this case the distribution
3To quote some examples, Beta, Gamma, Chi square, F , Lognormal, all follow this
general pattern (one maximum, one zero crossing and one minimum) if subject to ap-
propriately de…ned mean preserving spreads. Clearly, asymmetric distributions, while
preserving the pattern, trace out a more irregular function than that plotted in the …gure.
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of reservation prices is isomorphic to the income distribution, when the lat-
ter is lognormal (Cowell 1995, pp.71-78). One should however notice that,
independently of the speci…c form of the income distribution, our general
argument rests only on the idea that a mean preserving spread on incomes
generates single and double crossings of cumulative and density distributions
of the reservation prices – which is always the case if the reservation price is
monotonically increasing in income.4
Our demand function is clearly continuous and continuously di¤eren-
tiable. Moreover,
Qp = ¡f(p; µ)
Qpp < 0 for p < h (µ) ; Qpp > 0 for p > h (µ) ;
Qpp = 0 for p = h (µ)
This de…nition of market demand makes it clear that both its position and
its features depend on the parameter µ.
Our focus is on studying how changes in income dispersion a¤ect the
optimal behaviour of noncompetitive …rms. As is well known, changes of
this kind – which have apparently taken place in many countries – may be
attributed to long-run structural factors (such as the skill distribution of
workers, the insitutional framework of wage negotiations, the relative weight
of capitale vs labour income, etc.), as well as to changes in the shorter-run
redistributive e¤ects of …scal policy. As to the latter, one might think of y
as disposable income, and accordingly interpret changes in µ as (equal yield)
changes, e.g., in the degree of progression of the income tax schedule as
measured by the residual progression index.5
The crucial issue we are interested in is then how changes in µ translate
into comovements of demand and its elasticity. This may have some relevance
in its own, as pointing out a mechanism through which income distribution
a¤ects the degree of competition; however, it should also be recalled that
in a non-competitive general equilibrium setting the pro- or counter-cyclical
4In this sense the assumption p = y drastically simpli…es the exposition, with no sub-
stantial loss of generality. On the other hand, the binary-choice model of demand is widely
applied in the literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 1992); in the analysis of the relationship
between income distribution and demand it is very convenient, as continuous individ-
ual demand curves are standardly derived from omothetic preferences, which prevent any
discussion of distributional issues.
5As is well known, residual progression is (inversely) measured by the elasticity of post-
tax income to pre-tax income; an increase in this index shifts unambiguously down the
concentration curve (see, e.g., Lambert, 1990, chs 7 and 9). This Lorenz dominance is
equivalent, under a equal-yield constraint, to a mean preserving spread of the distribution
of disposable income.
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behaviour of demand elasticity is the key element to assess the role of demand
in determining the equilibrium output.6
Given market demand (3), the (positive) price elasticity of demand is
given by
´(p; µ) =
pf(p; µ)
1¡ F (p; µ) (4)
By di¤erentiating with respect to µ one easily obtains
´µ(p; µ) =
µ
fµ(p; µ)
f(p; µ)
+
Fµ(p; µ)
1¡ F (p; µ)
¶
´(p; µ) (5)
Simple inspection of (5) reveals that changes in µ a¤ect ´ di¤erently, depend-
ing on where p lies in the four intervals A, B, C and D identi…ed above.
A priori, the sign of ´µ is clearly unambiguous whenever fµ and Fµ have
the same sign, ambiguous otherwise: hence we can say that ´µ > 0 for p 2 A
and ´µ < 0 for p 2 C; in intervals B and D the sign of ´µ is potentially
ambiguous. However, since ´µ changes sign going from A to C, it follows
trivially by continuity that at least one point bp exists in the interior of B
such that ´µ = 0, and hence an interval bB ½ B exists where ´µ < 0 – the left
boundary of bB being bp. This allows us to establish the following
Proposition 1 For all distributions obeying (1) and (2), and such that a
change in µ generates single crossing of distributions and double crossing of
densities, there exists a non-empty interval bB where the normalized demand
function (3) and its elasticity (4) move in the same direction following a
change in µ:
Proof Follows trivially from the fact that, by the de…nition of B, Qµ(p; µ) =
¡Fµ(p; µ) < 0 for p 2 B, while by the de…nition of bB ½ B, ´µ(p; µ) < 0 for
p 2 bB: ¤
An immediate implication of this proposition is that, if the income dis-
tribution is subject to a change in dispersion as measured by µ, …rms whose
equilibrium price lies in the speci…ed range face a positive comovement in
demand and price elasticity. In particular, as incomes become less dispersed,
for all initial prices p 2 bB …rms experience an increase in both the level and
the elasticty of demand. Of course, Proposition 1 is a simple existence proof
for bp, which says nothing as to uniqueness in the set B and, a fortiori, over
6For a general discussion of di¤erent perspectives on the comovements of market de-
mand and its price elasticity, see Benassi et al. (1994, ch 5) and the references therein.
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the whole range of p – the sign of ´µ in area D is clearly still ambigous.
Sorting this out would enable us to determine the behaviour of ´ over the
whole range of p. The properties of the income distribution which deliver
uniqueness of bp are discussed in the next section.
3 Income share elasticity and the price elas-
ticity of demand
Ideally, one would expect to pin down a unique value bp, such that ´µ > 0 for
all p < bp and ´µ < 0 for all p > bp. Given that ´µ > 0 for p 2 A and ´µ < 0
for p 2 bB, ´µ crosses zero from above at the left boundary of bB, i.e.at bp.
In order to de…ne the conditions for bp to be unique, we …rst notice that the
derivative of ´µ with respect to p is
´µp =
´(p; µ)
f(p; µ)
µ
fpµ(p; µ)¡ fp(p; µ)
f(p; µ)
fµ(p; µ)
¶
(6)
+
µ
´p +
´2
p
¶·
fµ(p; µ)
f(p; µ)
+
Fµ(p; µ)
1¡ F (p; µ)
¸
which, for ´µ = 0 collapses to
´µpj´µ=0 =
´(p; µ)
p
¦µ (p; µ) (7)
where¦µ (y; µ) is the derivative with respect to µ of the income share elasticity
(Esteban, 1986). The latter is de…ned as
¦ (y; µ) = 1 +
yfy (y; µ)
f (y; µ)
and measures the percentage change of the income share accruing to individ-
uals of income y, given a marginal change in y.7 Esteban shows that there is
a one-to-one correspondence between f (y; ¢) and ¦ (y; ¢), so that any given
distribution can be characterized in terms of ¦.
Therefore, given (7),
at ´µ = 0, sign
£
´µp(p; µ)
¤
= sign [¦µ(p; µ)] (8)
This is particularly convenient, as the ¦ function typically exhibits some
useful regularity properties.
7Formally, ¦ = limh!0 1¹
R y+h
y xf (x; µ) dx, where ¹ is the mean income (Esteban 1986,
p.441).
7
